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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY-WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES-USE OF STATE LAw-Peti-
tioner's decedent, a carpenter, was employed by a contractor hired to repair 
the Bonneville Dam, which is owned and operated by the United States. 
During the course of his employment, decedent was drowned when the boat 
he was in capsized in the water below the dam. Petitioner sued the United 
States in federal district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 alleging 
that the accident was caused by the negligence of employees of the United 
States who were operating the dam. The claim was based on the Oregon 
Wrongful Death Statute2 and on the Oregon Employer's Liability Law, 
which, in certain circumstances, permits recovery for death if defendant 
employer did not "use every device, care and precaution which it is 
practicable to use for the protection and safety of life and limb."3 The 
district court held there was no negligence, and therefore no liability under 
the Wrongful Death Statute, and that the Employer's Liability Law did 
not apply because the use of the high standard of care established by the law 
would be unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground 
that there had not been any negligence and that the Employer's Liability 
Law "could not be constitutionally applied to this case."4 On certiorari to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed and remanded, two 
justices dissenting.I> When courts applying maritime law adopt state wrong-
ful death statutes, state substantive law is followed, even when the state 
standard of care is higher than the duty imposed by maritime law. Hess v. 
United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960). 
The Supreme Court in The Harrisburg,6 which overruled a number of 
lower court decisions,7 held that general maritime law gave no action for 
wrongful death, but indicated such actions would be allowed in admiralty 
if based upon statute.8 Subsequent cases approved the use of state wrong-
ful death statutes, where applicable, to escape the harsh general maritime 
law doctrine.9 Federal legislation providing remedies for wrongful death 
has diminished the need for applying state statutes,1° but they are still used 
128 u.s.c. (1958) §§1346 (b), 2674. 
2 Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §30.020. 
3 Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§654.305-654.335. 
4 Hess v. United States, (9th Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 285 at 292, cert. granted 359 U.S. 
923 (1959). 
5 Justices Harlan and Frankfurter. See note 20 infra. 
6119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
7 The Sea Gull, (C.C. Md. 1865) 21 Fed. Cas. 909 at 910, No. 12,578. See Cutting v. 
Seabury, (D.C. Mass. 1860) 6 Fed. Cas. 1083 at 1084, No. 3521 (dictum). 
s The Harrisburg, note 6 supra, at 213. 
9 E.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 at 242 (1921); The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 
398 at 406 (1907). 
10 The Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U .S.C. (1958) §761 provides 
a remedy for wrongful death but only if it occurs more than one marine league from 
shore; The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 Gones Act), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1958) 
§688 allows a recovery for the wrongful death only if the decedent was a "seaman" in the 
course of his employment. 
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in areas where federal law does not apply. Courts applying state wrongful 
death statutes have generally assumed that they create a new right of action 
for the maritime tort, a right rooted in state rather than maritime law,11 
and that in these instances state substantive law controls. This assumption 
was recently confirmed in The Tungus v. Skovgaard,12 where the Court 
held that a state wrongful death statute13 could give a remedy based on 
unseaworthiness only if the state statute was interpreted, as a matter of 
state law, to embrace such a claim. The statute there involved was so 
construed, although it imposed a duty of care in terms of ordinary common 
law negligence.14 The principal case follows The Tungus doctrine by re-
quiring the application of state substantive law. However, unlike the situa-
tion in The Tungus, the duty of care imposed by the state law in the 
principal case was higher than that found in maritime law and, to this 
ex.tent, the principal case represents an extension of that doctrine. In de-
cisions prior to The Tungus, a minority of -courts interpreted state wrong-
ful death statutes to provide only a remedy,15 and applied maritime 
substantive law under these statutes. This interpretation rested largely on 
the ground that the duty of care imposed by maritime law was a traditional 
maritime right, of which a person could not be deprived. This view was 
rejected in- The Tungus in favor of the application of state substantive law. 
However, upon comparison with The Tungus doctrine and its inherent 
difficulties, it would seem that th~ rejected view is supported by the more 
persuasive reasoning. Courts following the reasoning in both The Tungus 
;ind the principal case would appear to be required to apply the state 
standard of care regardless of whether it imposes a greater or lesser duty 
than that imposed by maritime law.16 The application of a lower state 
standard of care was avoided in The Tungus by interpreting the state 
wrongful death statute to incorporate the higher maritime standard of 
care.11 Other courts, however, have refused to use this fiction of incorpora-
11 The H.S., Inc., No. 72, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 341 at 343; K.lingseisen v. Costanzo 
Transportation Co., (3d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 902 at 903. See Pym v. The Great Northern 
Ry. Co., 4 B. &: S. 396, 122 Eng. Rep. 509 (1863). 
12 358 U.S. 588 (1959). 
13 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1952) §2A:31-1. 
14 The New Jersey act was patterned after the original Lord Campbell's Act, 9 &: 10 
Viet., C. 93 (1846). 
15 O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., (1st Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 708 at 711 (dictum); 
Pope&: Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 at 409 (1953) (dictum); Riley v. Agwilines, Inc., 296 
N.Y. 402 at 405, 73 N.E. (2d) 718 (1947). See also Wardner, "Enforcement of a Right of 
Action Acquired Under Foreign Law for Death Upon the High Seas," 21 HAR.v. L. REv. 
75 at 79 (1907). For discussion of the meaning of the dictum in Pope &: Talbot v. Hawn, 
see Kolius and Cecil, "Maritime Torts Resulting in Death in State Territorial Waters: The 
Skovgaard and Halecki Cases," 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 567 at 579 (1959); note, 34 TULANE L. 
REv. 181 at 182 (1959). 
16 See Babin v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., (La. App. 1957) 94 S. (2d) 715 at 716 
(1957); Graham v. Lusi, (5th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 223 at 225. But see note 20 infra. 
17 In The Tungus v. Skovgaard, note 12 supra, the Supreme Court accepted the court 
of appeals' interpretation of the New Jersey wrongful death statute. See note, 45 VA. L. 
REv. 1222 at 1223 (1959); Kolius and Cecil, "Maritime Torts Resulting in Death in State 
Territorial Waters: The Skovgaard and Halecki Cases," 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 567 (1959). 
1960] RECENT DECISIONS 1065 
tion because it cannot be justified by the language in the wrongful death 
statute.18 The problem of avoiding the application of a lower state standard 
of care would never arise if the view rejected in The Tungus were used by 
the courts. Under such a view, maritime law would be applied in every 
case and the normally higher duty of care19 imposed by this law would 
result in greater protection for the individual. Only in rare instances, as 
the principal case where the state statute requires an abnormally high 
standard of care, would there be an exception.20 
Moreover, the use of state wrongful death statutes substantively has 
created an indefensible anomaly in the law.21 In an area where state 
wrongful death statutes are used, recovery may tum on whether or not the 
injury is fatal. If fatal, state law applies, for the action will arise under the 
wrongful death statute; while if non-fatal, maritime law controls, since it 
affords a tort remedy.22 The ludicrousness of this situation is magnified 
when a wrongful death action and survival action are brought based on the 
same accident. For example, assume the decedent has been contributorily 
negligent. Since a state survival statute supplies only the remedy,23 mari-
time law with its comparative negligence rule applies, and there might still 
be a recovery. However, since a wrongful death.statute creates a new right 
under state substantive law, contributory negligence would be an absolute 
bar to any recovery.24 This anomaly can also be avoided by following the 
view rejected in The Tungus, as in all situations the substantive maritime 
law would control. Finally, it should be noted that the use of the different 
substantive law of each state under the view in the principal case may, in 
certain situations, violate the constitutional requirement of uniformity in 
maritime law.25 The Court in the principal case recognized this danger by 
leaving" ... open the question whether a state wrongful death action might 
contain provisions so offensive to traditional principles of maritime law 
18 E.g., Graham v. Lusi, note 16 supra, at 225. 
19 The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 at 8 (1890) (comparative negligence in maritime law); 
The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 at 122 (1936) (admiralty does not recognize assump-
tion of risk as a bar to recovery); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 at 105 (1944) 
(unseaworthiness doctrine puts an absolute duty on owner to supply a seaworthy ship). 
One reason for the greater protection of maritime law is its traditional ability to do what 
is "fair and just": The Sea Gull, note 7 supra, at 910; Pope 8e Talbot v. Hawn, note 15 
supra, at 409. See Hough, "Admiralty Jurisdiction - Of Late Years," 37 HAR.v. L. REv. 
529 at 529 (1924). 
20 In the principal case Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissented on the 
ground that the federal supremacy principle is violated when the states create a higher 
standard of duty than maritime law would require. Under this view it would be correct 
to apply state law as long as it affords no greater protection than maritime law. This 
result appears contrary to the traditional policies of admiralty discussed in note 19 supra. 
21 But see O'Leary v. United States Lines, note 15 supra, at 714 (dissent). 
22 Graham v. Lusi, note 16 supra, at 225. 
23 Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 at 392 (1940). 
24 Byrd v. Napoleon Ave. Ferry Co., (E.D. La. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 573 at 578, affd. per 
curiam (5th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 958, cert. den. 351 U.S. 925 (1956). 
25 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) established the uniformity doc-
trine but said state wrongful death statutes were an exception. The Jensen doctrine is 
discussed in GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY 333 et seq. (1957). 
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that the admiralty would decline to enforce them."2 6 Under the view that 
state wrongful death statutes furnish only a remedy to enforce maritime 
substantive law, there would be no interference with the uniformity doc-
trine. One solution to the foregoing difficulties is simply to adopt the 
"remedy" view of state wrongful death statutes, overruling The Tungus and 
all cases based on it, including the principal case.27 However, the obvious, 
and perhaps ultimately necessary, alternative solution is congressional 
legislation extending a wrongful death action to all situations where mari-
time law is applied, thus avoiding the problems created by the adoption of 
state statutes. Although Congress has been reluctant to act in this area in 
the past, the decision in the principal case may well provide sufficient im-
petus for the needed legislation. 
Louis Frey 
26 Principal case at 320. 
27 It should be noted that three justices in the majority of The Tungus decision are 
in the dissent in the principal case, and four justices join in the opinion of the Court in 
the principal case solely because of The Tungus, but reserve the right to overrule it; 
thus only two justices are in favor of this line of reasoning. Moreover, it has been suggested 
that The Harrisburg be overruled as the Court based its decision on English law which 
has since allowed a wrongful death action in maritime cases. 23 HALsnURY's LAws OF 
ENGLAND, 2d ed., §979 (1936). Some writers have suggested the wrongful death action is 
today part of our general law and not merely statutory. See note, 13 N.A.C.C.A. L.J 186 
at 189 (1954); Wardner, "Enforcement of a Right of Action Acquired Under Foreign Law 
